Derailed: Communicating Singapore’s mass transit crises [Case study] by PANG, A.,
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of 
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business 
8-2013 
Derailed: Communicating Singapore’s mass transit crises [Case 
study] 
PANG, A. 
Singapore Management University, augustine@smu.edu.sg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research 
 Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Business and Corporate Communications Commons, and the 
Transportation Commons 
Citation 
1 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research 
Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email cherylds@smu.edu.sg. 
124  CASEFILE
MEDIA
ASIA CASEFILE
Derailed: Communicating
Singapore’s mass transit crises
Augustine Pang
AUGUSTINE PANG is Assistant Professor of Public and Promotional Communication at the Wee Kim Wee School of 
Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
MEDIA ASIA 40(2), pp. 124–127
The case: In December 2011, one of Singapore’s main mass transit rail lines came to a standstill 
for several hours on two separate days. While occasional public transport breakdowns are 
unavoidable, the rail operator came under intense criticism for its poor handling of the 
incidents, including its failure in crisis communication.
Its value: This case can be used to illustrate a number of perspectives and concepts from the 
literature on crisis and organisational communication. Of particular contemporary interest is 
what the case shows about how communication technologies, including social media, should 
and should not be used by organisations.
With Christmas and year-end festivities around 
the corner, commuters jostling to get into the 
trains during the evening peak hours on the Sin-
gapore subway looked hurried, though not par-
ticularly harried. The heavier than usual crowds 
were to be expected at this time of year. However, 
what turned the mood sour was the breakdowns 
that began to occur and, like falling cards, even-
tually paralysed the entire North-South line. The 
heavily used metro line connects Singapore’s 
downtown to several heavily populated suburban 
areas. The unprecedented episode would go down 
as the most serious train breakdown in the 24-year 
history of SMRT, Singapore’s metro network op-
erator (Lim, 2012).
The first disruption, on 15 December 2011, 
lasted five hours while the second, on 17 December, 
lasted seven hours. With more than 220,000 com-
muters affected (Tan, 2012a), confusion reigned. 
Trains were stalled in underground tunnels and 
some commuters had to be guided onto the tracks 
to walk in the dark along the tunnel before they 
could emerge at the stations (Almenoar & Sim, 
2012a). When the doors of some trains did not 
open, and ventilation wore thin, train windows 
were smashed to let air in (Li, 2012). There was 
no respite for those who managed to make their 
way to the stations. There, they were faced with 
customer service officers who had received no 
formal training to deal with such incidents. Ad-
ditional manpower was short and late in deploy-
ing (Almenoar & Sim, 2012b). When commuters 
exited the stations to continue their journeys, they 
were faced with another set of disappointments. 
Bus-bridging services to ferry them onward came 
only hours later (Almenoar & Sim, 2012c).
Over the coming days, commuters seethed 
with anger. They lambasted the SMRT publicly, 
online—through blogs, chat forums, social-
networking sites and e-mail—and offline. Some 
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SMRT staff reportedly received “some nasty 
remarks and scolding” from commuters (Al-
menoar & Sim, 2011a). One commuter captured 
up general sentiment: “I don’t think their [SMRT’s] 
best is good enough yet” (Hong, 2012, p. A8). The 
Singapore government acted swiftly. Within days, 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong announced the 
commission of a Committee of Inquiry (COI) to 
get to the root of the problem.
Weeks after the incidents, Transport Minis-
ter Lui Tuck Yew declared during a parliamentary 
sitting that the crises “exposed gaps in emergency 
preparedness and crisis response, and we need to 
do better” (Lim, 2012, p. A10). The lack of crisis 
preparedness—it was to emerge later during the 
COI—came in several forms. First, train drivers 
said they had not been trained for emergency 
situations. So when trains stalled in the tunnel, it 
did not occur to them to turn on the ventilation 
switch to ensure air circulation (Almenoar, 2012). 
Second, even though SMRT did have a rail inci-
dent management plan, it was “too complicated”, 
declared an expert witness. The witness observed 
that the senior management lacked formal op-
erational training and its “competency regime … 
deals only with theoretical training qualifications” 
(Tan, 2012a). The plan was also activated too late.
Third, blame was directed at SMRT chief ex-
ecutive Saw Phaik Hwa, who resigned from SMRT 
shortly after the crises (Chang, 2012). She was 
accused of focusing on generating profits for her 
shareholders by converting open spaces into rent-
able retail space (Goh, 2012), doubling SMRT’s 
profits in the nine years she helmed it, instead 
of ensuring that the trains were well maintained 
for her main stakeholders, the commuters (Tan, 
2012c). It emerged that under her watch, SMRT’s 
maintenance budget had not increased since 2002 
despite increasing ridership, more frequent train 
runs and ageing structures (Tan, 2012b).
Fourth, even though SMRT apologised after 
the first crisis, its communication left much to be 
desired. When the first hint of a train breakdown 
occurred on 15 December, a message was sent to 
their co-workers—the taxi drivers—presumably 
to take advantage of the breakdown. The message, 
which was flashed on SMRT taxi drivers’ screens, 
read: “Income opportunity. Dear partners, there 
is a breakdown in our MRT train services from 
Bishan MRT to Marina Bay MRT stretch of sta-
tions.” A taxi passenger took a photo of the screen 
and posted it online. It went viral instantly and the 
message drew heavy criticisms for its insensitiv-
ity. SMRT apologised and explained that a wrong 
message template was used (Soh & Tan, 2011). 
Commuters also accused SMRT staff of not being 
able to communicate well over the public address 
system of the trains. An announcement like this 
was heard: “Due to a slight delay, there will be 
delay” (“The great SMRT cockup of 2011”, 2011). 
Communication updates from the corporate com-
munication could also have been more prompt 
using social media. SMRT’s official twitter, @
SMRT_Singapore, used to have this as descrip-
tion, “This is the official Twitter channel of SMRT. 
We’re here, 9am–6pm, Mon-Fri (excl public holi-
days)”. Lim (2011) argued that SMRT had since 
realised that social media does not have ‘official 
hours’ and has changed its twitter description.
The COI met in April 2012. It heard from a 
diverse range of people, from the embattled former 
CEO to staff manning stations and engineers. By 
July 2012, they concluded their six-week investiga-
tion and released a 358-page report. Among the 
key findings were that “a defective metal fastener 
in an assembly that held up a power-supplying 
rail had triggered the first breakdown on Dec 
15” (“What it’s all about”, 2012). The subsequent 
damage to trains went undetected and that led 
to the second breakdown on 17 December. More 
importantly, SMRT’s maintenance lapses and in-
cident management were found wanting. SMRT 
promised to shift its focus back to an “engineer-
ing-focused organisation” (Tan, 2012c, p. D2). The 
Singapore government said it shared the blame in 
the breakdowns (Tan, 2012d). As the regulator, the 
Land Transport Authority (LTA) must have held 
the SMRT accountable and it fell short.
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Lessons for crisis communication
This case presents several streams of research and 
teaching moments within the field of crisis com-
munication. Some suggestions are offered here.
First, the case can be seen from the ‘anticipa-
tory perspective’, i.e. how crisis planning can be 
further institutionalised as a critical function in 
organisations. Organisations often pay lip service 
to the need for crisis planning. Possessing a crisis 
plan is often used as an indicator of crisis pre-
paredness (Cloudman & Hallahan, 2006). More 
than that, how the conceptualisation of the plan 
can trigger drills to test out its rigor (Pang, Cropp 
& Cameron, 2006). Low, Chung and Pang (2012) 
argued that strong leadership and a healthy com-
munication culture could enhance the institution-
alisation of crisis plans. This stream of work is 
what Olaniran and Williams (2012) described as 
anticipatory perspective, how organisations an-
ticipate and pre-plan for crises before they occur.
Second, there is the management perspective, 
i.e. how the management could have been more 
proactive in addressing the myriad of issues the 
organisation faced. In one of his first comments, 
the CEO who succeeded Saw admitted there were 
“deep-seated issues” within SMRT’s management. 
“There are clearly managerial, structural, cultural 
and systemic issues that need addressing … And 
that is one of my top priorities,” he said (Tan, 
2012e). The question remains: What does it take 
for organisational leaders to begin to address these 
deep-seated issues while at the same time ensur-
ing normal functioning of the systems? One per-
spective offered by Heifetz, Grashow and Linsky 
(2009) is to foster adaptation, enabling employees 
to adapt to new levels of excellence even as they 
maintain current best practices. Corollary to that 
is getting employees to lead instead of a mere top-
down approach. Tichy and Bennis (2007) argued 
that it boiled down to making the judgment call. 
“Good leaders make a habit of sensing, framing, 
and aligning so that they are prepared for the call, 
which can arise any moment” (p. 99)
Third, we can apply the communication 
perspective, i.e. how messages can be tailored to 
distressed commuters. Jin, Pang and Cameron 
(2010) called for more sensitivity in addressing 
stakeholders’ emotions in times of crises. They 
identified critical stakeholders as primary publics 
who share three key characteristics:
•	 They	are	most	affected	by	the	crisis.
•	 They	share	common	interests,	and	destiny,	in	
seeing the crisis resolved.
•	 They	have	long-term	interests,	and	influences,	
on the organisation’s reputation and operation.
Often, organisations often assume stakehold-
ers to react rationally (Pang, Kim & Chaidaroon, 
in press). However, crises often bring out human 
irrationalities and emotions. Understanding the 
emotional upheavals stakeholders face in a crisis 
can help organisations design appropriate strate-
gies to address stakeholder needs. The sooner or-
ganisations accept that, the more agile they will be 
in responding to stakeholders, who now have an 
armoury of social media platforms to vent their 
complaints and observations. When organisations 
are slow in responding, stakeholder emotions 
dominate the information vacuum and cast the or-
ganisation in bad light (Pang, in press).
Jin, Pang and Cameron’s Integrated Crisis 
Mapping model (ICM) provides a framework to 
understand emotions. For transport failures, they 
found that stakeholders would experience anxiety, 
sadness and anger. They will engage in conative 
coping, seeking solutions to their problems instead 
of feeling helpless (Jin, Pang & Cameron, 2012). 
Given this perspective, organisations like SMRT 
facing such a crisis should tailor their messages 
to address the emotions experienced, and provide 
concrete measures for stakeholders to follow. 
Questions for discussion
1. What further crisis communication research 
can be stimulated by the SMRT crisis?
2. How can organisations leverage on the use of 
social media to communicate during crises?
3. How can organisations improve their systems 
after a major crisis like the one SMRT had?
127  DERAILED: COMMUNICATING SINGAPORE’S MASS TRANSIT CRISES
4. How can post-mortems be translated into 
organisational learning so that future errors 
can be prepared for and prevented?
5. How can organisations embark on the 
process of renewal after a major crisis in 
order for transformation to take root?
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